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Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015)
Keatan Williams
In an ongoing dispute, the Supreme Court has allowed retail natural gas
purchasers to bring state law anti-trust claims against natural gas pipelines for
price manipulation. While holding that the Natural Gas Act does not create field
pre-emption over these claims, the opinion hinted that there might still be conflict
pre-emption. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued forcefully that the majority had
misapplied and misconstrued the applicable case law, which, he argued, clearly
created field pre-emption.
I. INTRODUCTION
At issue in Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. was whether state anti-trust
claims, brought by a group of manufacturers, hospitals, and others (“Buyers”)
against interstate pipelines (“Pipelines”), were pre-empted by the Natural Gas
Act when the actions alleged in the suit affected both wholesale and retail gas
prices. 1 The Buyers alleged that the Pipelines manipulated the price index of
natural gas under state anti-trust law.2 The Buyers, as retail purchasers of natural
gas, alleged that they overpaid for natural gas due to the Pipeline’s manipulation
of the natural gas price indices.3 The Pipelines asserted that the Buyer’s price
manipulation claims were pre-empted by the Natural Gas Act because they
operated interstate pipelines.4 The Supreme Court of the United States held that
the Natural Gas Act did not pre-empt state anti-trust claims because state laws
were aimed at a broad field of anti-trust enforcement and not specifically at
natural gas regulation.5 The dissent argued that the majority poorly misconstrued
precedent.6 The Court did leave the door open, however, for conflict pre-emption
claims.7
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Natural Gas Act was enacted to regulate the interstate shipment and
sale of gas to local distributers for sale. 8 The act granted the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) (formerly the Federal Power Commission
(“FPC”)) rate-setting authority in the natural gas industry.9 Originally, the market
was divided in to three sections: pumping gas; shipping and selling gas to retail
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Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1594 (2015).
Id. at 1598.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1601.
See id. at 1603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1602 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1595; see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 682 (1954).
Pub. L. No. 75-688, § 5(a), 52 Stat. 821 (1938).
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sellers; and purchasing gas by users.10 Since 1992, the FERC has relied on a
competitive marketplace approach to determine rates. 11 The FERC generally
determines if a jurisdictional seller lacks market power and, if so, issues a blanket
certificate that allows the seller to charge market-based rates for gas.12 Within
this system, many large gas consumers began purchasing directly from gas
suppliers instead of from resellers.13
In 2003, the FERC found that a number of gas suppliers were falsely
reporting to price indices by “‘inflating the volume of trades, omitting trades, and
adjusting the price of trades.’” 14 In response, the FERC revoked numerous
blanket market certificates, issued a policy statement setting standards for price
reporting, and issued a Code of Conduct prohibiting actions that did not have a
legitimate business purpose.15 Additionally, Congress passed the Energy Policy
Act of 2005, giving the FERC further authority in regulating the manipulation of
the price indices.16
The Buyers were a number of businesses that purchased large quantities
of natural gas directly from interstate pipelines for their own use.17 The Buyers
brought numerous state-law antitrust suits in both state and federal courts against
the Pipelines. 18 The Pipelines removed the cases to the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada, where they were consolidated.19 The district
court granted summary judgment for the Pipelines on the basis that the Pipelines
were “jurisdiction sellers.”20 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed this decision. 21 The Ninth Circuit held that the price
manipulation affected both wholesale—jurisdictional—and retail—nonjurisdictional—sales, so state law claims were not pre-empted.22 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in order to resolve confusion in the lower courts.23
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Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1595.
Id. at 1597.
12
Id.; see Regulations Governing Blanket Marketer Sales Certificates, 57 Fed.
Reg. 57952, 57958 (Dec. 8, 1992).
13
Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1597; see General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278
(1997).
14
Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1597 (quoting FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT
ON PRICE MANIPULATION IN WESTERN MARKETS: FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION OF
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Id. at 1598; see Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594
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III. ANALYSIS
The Pipelines argued at the Supreme Court that state anti-trust lawsuits
are within the field that the Natural Gas Act pre-empts because the lawsuits
targeted activities that affected both wholesale and retail prices.24 The Pipelines
argued that because the FERC has authority to regulate wholesale prices and the
FERC has prohibited the type of activities the lawsuits target the, lawsuits were
pre-empted. 25 The Pipelines also argued that the lawsuits would allow state
courts to reach different conclusions than the FERC about the same activities.26
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, stating that the Natural
Gas Act “‘was drawn with meticulous regard for the continued exercise of state
power, not to handicap or dilute it in any way.’”27 The Court went on to state that
precedent “emphasize[s] the importance of considering the target at which the
state law aims in determining whether that law is pre-empted.”28 To support this
conclusion, the Court pointed to precedent that considers the “‘significant
distinction’” in gas law pre-emption to be between “‘measures aimed directly at
interstate purchasers and wholesale for resale, and those aimed at’ subjects left to
the States [sic] to regulate.”29 The Court contrasted this precedent with Northern
Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission of Kansas, where pre-emption
was found because the state laws were “‘unmistakably and unambiguously
directed at purchasers.’”30
The Pipelines presented Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. as contrary
authority to the conclusion in Northern Natural.31 In Schneidewind, the Court
held that a state law requiring public utilities to obtain state approval before
issuing long-tern securities was pre-empted by the Natural Gas Act. 32 In the
present case, the Court rejected this argument, again focusing on what the state
laws intend to regulate.33 The Court distinguished the present case because the
state laws at issue in Schneidewind were specifically aimed at controlling the
rates and facilities of natural gas companies.34
The Pipelines also focused on the need for a “clear division between
areas of state and federal authority in natural-gas regulation.”35 The Court stated
that this need is an ideal and does not reflect how natural gas regulation works in
24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. (quoting Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ind., 332 U.S.
507, 517-518 (1947)).
28
Id. (emphasis in original).
29
Id. at 1600 (quoting N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 372
U.S. 84, 94 (1963)).
30
Id. (quoting Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S.
493, 514 (1989) (citing N. Natural, 372 U.S. at 92)) (emphasis in original).
31
Id. (discussing Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988)).
32
Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 306-09.
33
Oneok, 135 C. Ct. at 1600-01.
34
Id. at 1600.
35
Id. at 1601.
25
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the real world. 36 The Pipelines additionally presented two other cases they
believed showed the FERC’s authority to regulate activities that have
consequences on retail sales.37 The Court rejected both of these arguments.38
In Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, the Court held that the
Federal Power Act pre-empted state inquiries in to electricity prices previously
approved by the FERC.39 The Pipelines argued that this case upheld pre-emption
of state regulations similar to the regulations in the current case.40 The Court held
that Mississippi Power was a conflict pre-emption issue and was not applicable to
the current case. 41 The Court further distinguished the current case, again
focusing on what the state laws aimed to regulate, instead of the activities they
actually regulated. The Court held that the pre-empted laws in Mississippi Power
were specifically directed at jurisdictional sales of natural gas, unlike the current
case.42
The Pipelines also argued that Federal Power Commission v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co. was controlling.43 In Louisiana Power, the Court held that the
FPC had the authority to order interstate pipelines to “curtail gas deliveries to all
customers, including retail customers.” 44 The Pipelines argued that Louisiana
Power showed that the FERC has the authority to regulate index manipulation,
including how it affects retail prices.45 The Court distinguished Louisiana Power
as another conflict pre-emption case and determined it was not precedential in the
current case. 46 The Court did focus on the possibility of future conflict preemption claims, however, but left them “for the lower courts to resolve.”47
Lastly, the Court refused to defer to the FERC’s determination that field
pre-emption bared the Buyer’s claims.48 The Court stated that no such previous
determination existed, and even if one did exist, it would not “offset the other
considerations that weigh against a finding of pre-emption in this context.”49
IV. CONCLUSION
By holding against field pre-emption, the Court has allowed, for now,
companies who purchase retail gas from interstate pipelines to bring state law
anti-trust claims against interstate pipeline operators. The Court affirmed the rule
36

Id.
Id. at 1601-02; see Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487
U.S. 354, 377 (1988); Fed. Power Comm’n v. La. Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972).
38
Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1601-02.
39
Miss. Power, 487 U.S. at 377.
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Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1601.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1602 (citing La. Power, 406 U.S. 621).
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Id. (discussing La. Power, 406 U.S. at 642) (emphasis in original).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1602-03.
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Id.
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of focusing on what a state law aims to regulate in determining pre-emption
cases. The Court refused to determine whether or not conflict pre-emption
existed because neither party briefed the issue. This case potentially exposes
interstate pipelines that sell directly to customers to further liability. These
implications may have future affects on how the natural gas market develops in
the United States. The dissent is notable because it suggested that a clear line be
drawn between federal and state regulation in natural gas law. 50 The dissent
argued that once federal regulation has been applied to an act, all state laws
should be pre-empted from applying to that act. 51 The majority trumped this
argument, holding that the aim of the state laws was more important than the
actual activity that the laws were regulating. 52 This case lends itself to a
narrower, rather than broader, reading of state pre-emption in the context of
natural gas law.
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Id. at 1607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1603.
Id. at 1600 (majority opinion).

